Indian Air Force Fighter Squadron Strength: A Policy Analysis of Gaps, Risks, and Strategic Choices

India’s air power calculus sits at the intersection of deterrence credibility, industrial capability, and fiscal prioritisation. Among the most debated issues in recent years has been the fighter squadron strength of the Indian Air Force (IAF) relative to its sanctioned requirement.

The discussion is often reduced to a headline number — 42 versus ~30 — but policy evaluation demands a deeper examination:

• What does the 42-squadron benchmark represent?
• How severe is the current shortfall?
• What are the structural causes?
• And most importantly, what policy choices determine the trajectory over the next decade?

1. The 42-Squadron Benchmark: Strategic Assumptions

The IAF’s sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons emerged from long-standing strategic planning premised on a potential two-front contingency involving both western and northern borders.

A squadron typically consists of 16–18 aircraft, implying a notional strength of approximately 700–750 combat aircraft at full sanctioned capacity.

However, open-source assessments and parliamentary disclosures over recent years indicate that the IAF’s operational strength has declined to roughly 30–31 squadrons, placing the active fleet closer to 540–580 combat aircraft.

This suggests a shortfall of approximately 10–12 squadrons, or nearly 170–200 aircraft, relative to the sanctioned benchmark.

From a force planning perspective, this gap affects:

• Sustained sortie generation in high-intensity operations
• Reserve depth for attrition
• Simultaneous theatre dominance
• Maintenance and rotation buffers

While air warfare is increasingly technology-driven, capacity still matters in prolonged engagements.

2. Structural Causes of the Decline

The reduction in squadron numbers has not resulted from policy neglect alone; it reflects structural and transitional realities.

A. Retirement Cycle Outpacing Induction

The phased retirement of legacy fleets such as the Mikoyan MiG-21, along with ageing Jaguars and MiG-27 variants (already retired), reduced squadron numbers significantly.

These aircraft had extended service lives but were no longer viable in contemporary threat environments.

Induction timelines for replacements, however, were slower than originally envisaged, leading to a temporary capability trough.

B. Procurement and Production Delays

India inducted 36 units of the Dassault Rafale, which substantially enhanced qualitative capability.

However, quantitative replacement required larger volumes.

The indigenous HAL Tejas programme represents a major strategic shift toward self-reliance. Yet, production ramp-up has faced:

• Engine supply dependencies
• Supply chain bottlenecks
• Manufacturing scale constraints

Defence manufacturing, particularly aerospace, is capital-intensive and technologically complex. Transitioning from licensed production to indigenous design and scaled output is structurally challenging.

C. Budgetary Trade-Offs

India’s defence budget must balance:

• Personnel costs
• Capital acquisition
• Infrastructure modernisation
• Maritime and land force requirements

Air power modernisation competes within a finite capital envelope. Policy sequencing becomes critical.

3. Is the Numerical Gap Strategically Critical?

This question requires nuance.

Capability vs Quantity

The Rafale fleet, advanced air-to-air missiles, improved electronic warfare suites, and integration of network-centric warfare systems significantly raise qualitative combat power.

Modern air campaigns depend on:

• AEW&C platforms
• Long-range precision weapons
• ISR networks
• Integrated air defence systems
• Drones and loitering munitions

A technologically superior squadron today delivers disproportionately higher combat value compared to legacy fleets.

However, force density still influences operational sustainability. High sortie rates over extended durations require numerical resilience.

Thus, the shortfall is not catastrophic — but it is strategically material.

4. Future Pathways: Policy Scenarios

 

Scenario 1: Incremental Recovery

Under current induction pipelines:

• Tejas Mk-1A squadrons progressively fill gaps
• MRFA (114 aircraft proposal) proceeds on schedule
• Jaguar life extensions provide interim buffers

This could gradually restore strength toward the mid-30s by early next decade.

Scenario 2: Accelerated Indigenous Scaling

If domestic production lines scale significantly:

• Faster Tejas Mk-1A output
• Timely Tejas Mk-2 induction
• Clear roadmap for AMCA

India reduces import dependence while building industrial depth.

This scenario strengthens long-term sovereignty but demands disciplined execution.

Scenario 3: Expanded Sanction (Beyond 42)

There are discussions in strategic circles about whether 42 squadrons remain sufficient in a rapidly evolving threat matrix.

If planners revise requirements upward (e.g., toward 45–50 squadrons), the policy challenge intensifies further.

5. Industrial Policy Imperative

The fighter squadron debate ultimately connects to a larger question:

Can India build a globally competitive aerospace industrial ecosystem?

True preparedness requires:

• Stable long-term order books
• Private sector participation
• Engine technology indigenisation
• Export viability
• Shorter procurement cycles

Without industrial scale, squadron recovery will remain cyclical and reactive.

6. Comparative Regional Context

China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) operates a significantly larger combat fleet, with rapid induction of modern aircraft types.

Pakistan maintains a smaller but increasingly modernised fleet, including upgraded platforms and precision weapon integration.

India’s strategy therefore must balance:

• Technological edge
• Theatre flexibility
• Sustainable capacity

The IAF’s qualitative edge in several domains remains credible. But maintaining deterrence requires visible and measurable capacity restoration.

7. Conclusion: Not a Crisis — But a Strategic Inflection Point

India’s fighter squadron shortfall is real.
It is measurable.
It has structural causes.

But it is not irreversible.

The coming decade will determine whether India:

• Merely fills a temporary gap, or
• Transforms into a self-reliant aerospace power.

Defence preparedness, much like corporate transformation, depends on sustained execution — not episodic decisions.

The policy challenge is not just about reaching 42 squadrons again.
It is about building a system that ensures India never falls significantly below strategic requirements in the future.

The squadron debate, therefore, is not simply about numbers.
It is about industrial capacity, execution discipline, and long-term national resolve.